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The Internet’s Promise
Without a doubt, the Internet revolu-
tionized the dissemination of informa-
tion and the ability of individuals to 
engage with each other. The euphoria 
surrounding the early days of the Inter-
net’s expansion into the public sphere 
predicted that technology would ex-
pand democracy and empower citizens 
around the world. The conventional 
wisdom thought citizen participation 
would multiply online with e-govern-
ment, and the public would have better 
oversight of the state thanks to new ca-
pabilities for monitoring administra-
tive and executive actions. The power 
of the Internet to disseminate informa-
tion from one to millions and the pow-
er of the Internet to foster conversa-
tions seemed an unstoppable force for 
democratic discourse. Popular move-
ments like the Arab Spring, the Occupy 
Movement, and the Bernie Sanders 
U.S. presidential campaign illustrated 
that information technologies could 
indeed significantly enhance and en-
able political organizing on a new, 
unprecedented scale. Many expected 
that mechanisms like open electronic 
proceedings for rule making and open 
data for government transparency 
would herald better representative gov-
ernment and decision making. 
D
IGITA L TE CH NOLOG IES  HAVE 
unleashed profound forces 
changing and reshaping 
rule making in the democ-
racies of the information 
society. Today, we are witnessing a 
transformative period for law and 
governance in the digital age. Elected 
representative government and demo-
cratically chosen rules vie for author-
ity with new players who have emerged 
from the network environment. At the 
same time, network technologies have 
unraveled basic foundational prereq-
uisites for the rule of law in democracy 
like privacy, freedom of association, 
and government oversight. The digital 
age, thus, calls for the emergence of a 
Digitocracy—a new set of more complex 
governance mechanisms assuring pub-
lic accountability for online power held 
by state and nonstate actors through 
the creation of new checks and bal-
ances among a more diverse group of 
players than democracy’s traditional 
grouping of a representative legisla-
ture, executive branch, and judiciary. 
Where Google and Facebook know 
more than most spy agencies about the 
lives of millions of citizens as well as the 
inner workings of companies and gov-
ernments, information powerhouses 
and platforms can establish their own 
rules for citizens’ interactions online. 
Where public-sector surveillance and 
private-sector tracking are so pervasive, 
citizens lose the ability to control the 
disclosure of their thoughts, friends, 
activities, and no longer have privacy. 
Where lone coders wreak massive hav-
oc for private gain or for opposition to 
governmental policies, they can use 
their information resources to reject 
majority rule. Where technology can 
protect the anonymity of wrongdoers, 
rule-breakers can escape accountabil-
ity. In short, the modern information 
society destroys one of the most fun-
damental truths of any democracy that 
“the power to make the laws rests with 
those chosen by the people.”a
a King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
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circumvent traditional political checks 
and balances and the public’s over-
sight of government suffers irrepara-
bly. For example, in Oakland, CA, the 
police engaged in a mass-scale surveil-
lance program to geo-locate thousands 
of mobile phones using stingray devic-
es without any judicial approval and, in 
New York City, the police program to 
record drivers through traffic cams and 
smart city sensors also escapes judicial 
oversight. At the same time, technolog-
ically enabled leaks and wide dissemi-
nation of non-public activities of gov-
ernment through sites like WikiLeaks 
may jeopardize legitimate functions 
of government such as international 
relations and active law enforcement 
investigations. Snowden’s leaks, for 
example, are reported to have endan-
gered the lives of British M16 agents in 
Russia and China.
Laws lose their authority when gov-
ernments can no longer control the 
use of power to enforce rules and hack-
ers have control over weapons of mass 
disruption. Network infrastructure 
removes the state’s monopoly on the 
use of coercive, police power to enforce 
rules and protect its citizens. Technol-
The Internet’s technical infrastruc-
ture turns out to challenge the promise 
of the political empowerment of citi-
zens. Just as network technologies of-
fered organizational tools for political 
empowerment, the technologies them-
selves provided the means to reverse the 
hope that the Internet would be a one-
way pro-democracy force. Network in-
frastructure proved that it could be used 
to frustrate empowerment dreams. 
Egypt, for example, pulled the plug on 
the Internet for several days during the 
Arab Spring uprisings to block political 
organizing; Brazil shut down WhatsApp 
for 48 hours; local police in the U.S. used 
stealth Stingray technology to engage in 
large-scale geo-surveillance of citizens. 
And, at the same time, Twitter bots 
flooded social media in order to shut 
down political dialog or to falsify sup-
port for candidates, while hate and bul-
lying flourish online. In short, the Inter-
net has embedded the means to block 
political empowerment and discourse.
Undermining Democracy
In the intervening years since the early 
euphoria over the Internet’s political 
potential, the embedding of the In-
ternet in our daily lives has effectively 
demonstrated new vulnerabilities. The 
Internet’s infrastructure has already 
displaced three key areas essential to 
the rule of law in democracy: sover-
eignty, government accountability, 
and respect for law. Internet technolo-
gies restructure a state’s ability to pre-
scribe and assure the enforcement of 
law. Governments forfeit sovereignty 
to networks when services like cloud 
computing transcend borders and 
enable organizations to choose rules 
in the blink of an eye. Network archi-
tecture enables technology develop-
ers and service providers to embed 
rules for online activities through 
infrastructure choices. For example, 
cloud service providers like Dropbox 
make determinations every day on 
the security of users’ data. These en-
cryption decisions determine the very 
capability of states to examine user 
data in lawful investigations. 
Network infrastructure undermines 
the oversight and accountability of 
government. While open government 
technologies enable greater transpar-
ency of public institutions, electronic 
tools also empower governments to IM
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for privacy have become more power-
ful in people’s lives than rules from the 
democratic constitutional framework. 
Business organizations are likely to 
serve as counterweights to govern-
ment power. Google’s Transparency 
Report, Apple’s defiance of an FBI re-
quest for encryption keys, and Micro-
soft’s challenge to U.S. government 
access to foreign-based servers each 
reflect a check on the state’s intrusive-
ness. And, individuals like Snowden 
may serve as counterweights to states 
and businesses. Individuals and as-
sociations of individuals have direct 
authority when they coalesce with on-
line tools ranging from social media to 
hacktivism as they perceive the need 
to interject and amplify their end goals 
online. All while national government 
provides checks on overreaching pri-
vate actors. Where each actor from a 
state to an individual can assure mass 
disruption online, fair governance will 
require co-existence among the rule-
making actors. 
At the core, the assurance of public 
accountability online is the key objec-
tive of Digitocracy. The mechanisms 
for states, private actors and citizens 
to co-exist as rule-makers in the net-
worked society are likely to be defined 
in unexpected ways incorporating no-
tions of federalism, multistakeholder 
governance, and subsidiarity. These 
tools will draw the boundaries of rule-
making authority among the state ac-
tors, platform operators, corporate orga-
nizations, and empowered users. Each 
actor, whether state or non-state, has an 
important role to prevent overreaching 
by the other actors. In essence, Digitoc-
racy constructs a more multifaceted 
set of interwoven checks and balances 
to establish limits on the powers of 
both state and non-state actors and a 
reliance on both to protect the public 
good. For our future, now is the time 
to begin the robust public discussion 
on our means of governance in the 
digital age. 
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ogy allows lone-wolf actors unchecked 
by states to create and deploy weapons 
of mass disruption whether through 
malware, ransomware, or botnets. For 
example, hospitals across the U.S. in 
the spring of 2016 faced a wave of ran-
somware attacks that left some in a 
“state of emergency.” ISIS uses crowd 
sourcing to sow terror in the U.S. and 
Europe. Simultaneously, the infrastruc-
ture empowers private actors to engage 
in vigilante actions. The underground 
group, Anonymous, recently illustrat-
ed such actions when they threatened 
an electronic attack against ISIS fol-
lowing the Paris massacres in Novem-
ber 2016. In essence, individuals and 
associations now have tools—outside 
the ability of state control—to enforce 
their choices and rules online in ways 
that are independent of the state. To 
be sure when a Texas college discov-
ered in 2015 that Facebook provided 
better real-time information for an on-
campus police emergency than 911, it 
becomes clear the state has even lost 
control over basic information it needs 
to protect its citizens.
Beyond undermining key aspects of 
the rule of law, the Internet’s infrastruc-
ture has toppled critical, substantive 
legal pillars of democracy. Freedom of 
thought and association as well as pub-
lic safety are essential elements of de-
mocracy and privacy is a prerequisite. 
Yet, the network infrastructure con-
tradicts the basic tenents of freedom 
of association and privacy. Network 
functionality works thanks to ubiqui-
tous data surveillance. The resulting 
transparency of citizens to those in the 
network undermine both state and citi-
zen’s respect for the rule of law. States 
lose important checks and balances 
against omnipotent acquisition of in-
formation and citizen’s freedom of 
thought and association are undercut. 
Counterintuitively, public safety and 
security are also destabilized by the 
transparency when stalkers, social en-
gineering hackers, and cyberwarriors 
find the informational keys to success 
readily accessible online. 
Freedom of expression is another 
cornerstone of democracy. Yet, de-
mocracies have a capability problem 
dealing with socially destructive con-
tent like hate, threats, and cyberbul-
lying that jeopardize public order and 
individual safety. Technology allows 
rapid and widespread dissemination 
of harmful content, while wrongdo-
ers can shield their activities from ac-
countability through encryption and 
anonymity tools. At the same time, free-
dom of expression limits the authority 
of states to ban nefarious online con-
tent. In the U.S., for example, there is 
no public recourse for the rapid growth 
of anti-Semitic Twitter accounts. Users 
must appeal to the social media firms 
who, in turn, then decide what to sup-
press or censor. By contrast, in Europe, 
platforms bear more legal responsibil-
ity for content, but firms are often left 
in the same position as an all-powerful 
censor. In effect, government is un-
able to suppress the vile and corrosive 
online material that threatens citizens 
without resorting to oppressive, anti-
democratic controls. 
The Opportunity of Digitocracy
The information society lacks a model 
of governance suited to the digital age. 
Going forward, the digital age will need 
a new system of checks and balances 
for its political decision making—a 
“Digitocracy”—offering the opportuni-
ty to develop new governing principles 
that articulate who regulates what to 
preserve public accountability online. 
Our challenge is how to construct 
the appropriate checks and balances. 
Digitocracy’s dynamic will be much 
more complex than the analog world. 
Online private rule making like Twit-
ter’s decisions regarding censorship, 
Adobe’s technical protections on digi-
tal content, and Facebook’s settings 
Beyond undermining 
key aspects of 
the rule of law, 
the Internet 
infrastructure has 
toppled critical 
substantive legal 
pillars of democracy.
